The design of embedded systems is often supported by the definition of executable models for tools like Matlab/Simulink or Scilab/Xcos. These models play a pivotal role in the development process and their correctness is thus extremely important. Many different solutions exist for the definition of suitable tests to "exercise" these models, but only a few (partial) solutions exist for assessing the quality of execution (simulation) results, that is, for defining suitable oracles. This paper addresses the problem and proposes a formal language for specifying the oracles and relating them to existing models. It also presents Apolom, a prototype tool for checking simulation results against stated oracles. The empirical assessment we conducted to assess the viability of the proposed solution is organized around four case studies and witnesses interesting results in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and required resources.
Introduction
Embedded software is the heart of many complex systems and failures in these systems may result in death (Bogdanich 2010) , economic losses (Philips 2012) , and environmental damages (Sweet 1996) . The role of these systems calls for their meticulous design, implementation, and validation to discover potential problems as early as possible. One viable approach has been the use of model-based solutions, where the design is carried out through executable models, then used to simulate the behavior of the actual system. The validation of these models is performed through simulation before the deployment of the resulting software on the target hardware. Thus, the quality of these models is essential to the correctness of delivered systems.
Matlab/Simulink, a commercial tool by MathWorks, and its free alternative Xcos, from The Scilab Consortium, define a de-facto standard for the design and simulation of embedded systems in many different domains, like avionics, automotive, and telecommunication. The plain execution of Simulink/Xcos models is often not enough to assess the quality of the systems they define. Designed models are complex entities (Reicherdt and Glesner 2012) and defects may not be easy to detect. These systems produce large and complex outputs, whose manual validation is almost impossible. In addition, the correctness of these systems often depends on severe temporal constraints. One obvious solution, borrowed from conventional software development, is thus testing these models as means to probe their correctness.
Besides identifying proper test cases, the definition of suitable instruments for assessing the correctness of obtained results is key. This is the so-called oracle problem (Gaudel 1995) and this paper addresses it in the specific context of Simulink models. In practice, the problem is often tackled by asking human testers to decide whether results are correct, and even Simulink native assertion blocks (The MathWorks Inc 2016) are seldom used. In contrast, we believe that more significant and principled solutions are necessary. Effective automated oracles would increase the quality of models, and of the final systems, by providing more rigor and precision and by eliminating error-prone manual analyses. Furthermore, automated solutions would allow for reducing the costs associated with testing activities, thus fostering a gain in productivity.
The paper proposes an innovative solution for specifying oracles for Simulink models, that is, to decide whether obtained results match expected ones. Simulink has peculiar characteristics that challenge the definition of oracles: (i) large sequences of values produced through simulation; (ii) sequences of values produced with different frequencies; and (iii) temporal dependencies among them. Our solution tackles these problems by proposing a specification language based on temporal logic to let the user focus on the temporal dependencies between the values of the signals (in the Simulink model) of interest. The user decides the signals in the Simulink model that must be probed and analyzed and a simple mapping mechanism relates signals to variables in the oracle specification.
Even if there have been some proposals for testing Simulink models (Lee and Friedman 2013; Boden et al. 2005; Zander-Nowicka et al. 2006; Reactive Systems Inc 2015) , to the best of our knowledge the oracle problem has been often underestimated, and the use of external formal models neglected. This paper proposes a semi-automated solution to fill the gap. Oracles must be aware of the expected outputs and define how to compare them against obtained results (Memon et al. 2003) . Although there are different ways to define the expected outcome, the paper proposes a specificationbased solution since we think specifications are a natural way to state the key properties of a system. The proposed approach is supported by a dedicated tool, called Apolom, and the paper demonstrates the viability of the solution through empirical assessment.
To summarize, the key contributions of the paper, and the main differences between our approach and existing solutions (Sect. 5), are:
-The use of an "external" formal language based on temporal logic to provide the user with a powerful means (high expressiveness) for the definition of complex time-related constraints. -A better separation of concerns between a (Simulink) model and the requirements/constraints on it. Different languages also foster the adoption of different viewpoints and help emphasize different characteristics. -The use of modularization and of a trigger-dependency mechanism to structure and relate requirements. Trigger-dependency rules also permit the identification of different types of violations and the definition of alternative behaviors if some properties are violated. -The definition of a complete solution, along with Apolom, our prototype verification engine, that is (at a large extent) independent of the specific modeling tool. Note that our solution only covers the oracle problem and does not aim at other dimensions of the problem of assessing the quality of Simulink 1 models. For example, the proposed solution can be augmented with both solutions for selecting test cases [e.g., (Lee and Friedman 2013; Reactive Systems Inc 2015) ] and for the static verification of created models [a-la Simulink Design Verifier (The MathWorks Inc 2016a)].
This paper builds on previous work Nardi et al. (2013) , which introduced the main concepts and concentrated on the presentation of our oracle generation tool. This work presents the specifics of our solution, with more details about the oracle generation process and the use of temporal specifications. It also presents the results of our empirical assessment to highlight and validate the key characteristics of the proposal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the key elements of oracle specification. Section 3 introduces Apolom, our prototype tool for checking simulation results against stated oracles. Section 4 describes the empirical assessment. Section 5 surveys related approaches, and Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
Oracle definition
An oracle specifies what the system is supposed to do: given the inputs, it must stateexplicitly or implicitly-the outcome produced by the model. Oracles must be formal enough to be interpreted by an automated means, but a complete and correct definition could be as complex and error-prone as the actual system (Weyuker 1982) . A common solution is thus the use of higher-level abstractions: there is no need to specify the exact expected output in all cases, but the constraints it must obey to are enough. In addition, Simulink models usually produce large amounts of data, and their structure is often complex.
In our solution, input and output signals are abstracted as variables in the oracle specification, then mapped onto (linked to) the elements of the actual Simulink model. For instance, if the tester wanted to evaluate whether alarm is on when smoke is detected, then s/he should identify the two Simulink signals (one for alarm and one for smoke), and map them onto the variables used in the specification. The values produced by the signals are then used to feed the corresponding variables in the specification at each simulation instant.
More precisely, variables are structured as sequences and can refer to either signal values or simulation times. Since signals vary over time (The MathWorks Inc 2016), a variable of the first type stores all the values the signal assumes over a period of time. The number of values in a sequence depends on the number of values that a (Simulink) block is configured to produce in a time interval. For example, if a block produced a new value every 0.25 s, and we considered a 1-s simulation, a variable would render the outgoing signal as a sequence of 5 values. A variable of the second type stores sequences of values that correspond to the values that the simulated time assumes after each step; the difference between two values is always the period (sample time) used for the simulation. The mapping of the variables of the first type onto the signals (of interest) in the model enables the automated creation of a new model that instruments the original one to retrieve produced results automatically during simulation.
This work only considers fixed step simulations. Even if it is common that different blocks, in models that comprise both discrete and continuous blocks, produce outputs at different rates, a unique sample time must be set at the beginning and all signals are then normalized accordingly. The highest rate defines the sampling period, and at each step either a new value is produced or the current one is repeated if the particular signal changes more slowly. For example, if in the same time window we had signals (variables) A = {2, 4, 6, 8} and B = {3, 6, 9}, since A changes more frequently than B, the actual sequence associated with B becomes {3, 3, 6, 9}. This also means that if we wanted to run a simulation for a given number of time units, the actual simulated time window would depend on the highest rate in the model. For example, if we wanted to simulate a model for 100 s, and the fastest block produces a new value every 0.2 real seconds, the simulation should reproduce 500 time units of the foreseen behavior of the system. Oracles, along with obtained results, must be properly stored to allow the developer/tester to study them. One can think of changing the model, that is, the future implementation, without touching the oracle to understand the consequences of implementing the same requirements in different ways. For example, if one were interested in a what-if approach, s/he could test (slightly) different models to understand their specific capabilities and the differences among them. One could also change the oracle, and keep the model, to challenge the foreseen solution against different guarantees. This is why, besides proposing a suitable specification language for reasoning on the different values variables can assume, our goal is also to provide a frame to orga-nize the different constraints set on input/output values into a structured, coherent, and (hopefully) complete specification of the system. A proper configuration/version management system can thus help keep track of the different alternatives and relate obtained results to the proper oracles and models.
Specification language
Simulink models simulate dynamic systems, that is, systems that can be defined as a set of possible states together with a function that determines the current state with respect to past ones (Alligood et al. 2000) . This means that these systems call for specification languages that allow one to predicate on their temporal evolutions, and temporal logics have been often used for this Baresi and Young (2001) . Temporal languages may express time qualitatively, to define mutual relations between events, and quantitatively, to measure time distances. Qualitative operators provide ways to express properties like precedence, eventuality, and invariance. Quantitative operators grant the ability to state that a given property will hold k time units from the current time instant (Felder and Morzenti 1994) .
Our solution uses TRIO to predicate on variables. TRIO (Ghezzi et al. 1990 ) is a first-order temporal specification language that provides qualitative and quantitative temporal operators in addition to the usual propositional connectives and existential and universal quantifiers. Moreover, TRIO allows one to check the conformity of executions (traces) against specifications (Felder and Morzenti 1994) . These characteristics influenced our decision to use this language for specifying oracles.
Any TRIO operator is derived from the basic temporal operator Dist (A, t), where A is a formula and t a term that indicates a time distance. It states that A must hold at a time instant at t time units from the current instant, where t may be negative, zero, or positive (for past, present and future instants, respectively). For example, the following formula defines operator Futr, which states that A must be true in t time units from now:
TRIO is not limited to a preset list of temporal operators. Instead, a more comprehensive number of new operators can be derived from Dist. For example:
intuitively means that A 2 must hold in the future and A 1 will hold from instant t 1 until when A 2 will hold. Table 1 presents a list of widely used TRIO temporal operators. The interested reader can refer to Felder and Morzenti (1994) and Ghezzi et al. (1990) for a more complete list and a more detailed presentation of the language. In addition, the version of TRIO used in this work does not allow for recursion, or behaviors within behaviors, and provides dedicated operators to help retrieve important data from simulation:
-NowOn(A) returns the number of instants behavior A holds consecutively starting from the current (analysis) instant; Note that Instant() returns the analysis instant, from 0 to n, while Clock() also takes into account the sampling period p, and thus Clock() = I nstant () · p. This means that if the sample interval is equal to 0.2s, instant 1 represents 0.2s and instant 10 corresponds to 2s of simulation.
All these operators-conventional TRIO ones and those newly defined aboveallow one to state interesting properties of the models (systems) under test. For example:
Example 1 A simple system that given an input (in(a)) must produce an output (out (b)) for at least 5 instants can be specified as:
Example 2 A more complex avionics system may require that if the difference between the autopilot roll command and the actual roll (rolldiff ) is greater than x degrees for a time interval (interval) longer than t 1 instants, a red indicator must be switched on to indicate a critical situation until the difference decreases to a safer value. A safety protocol (sa f et y) must be started within the next t 2 instants and should last the same number of instants as interval. Also, a yellow indicator must be switched on after the safe degree is reached and until the alarm is turned off. These constraints can be specified as:
The first line identifies the first instant (the starting point) of an interval where the difference between rolls (rolldiff ) is greater than x. The second line counts how many instants the difference is greater than x from the starting point and verifies whether it lasts longer than allowed (t 1 ). If both conditions hold, then the third line guarantees that the red indicator is on for the same time interval in which rolldiff is critical. The fourth line verifies if the safety protocol is activated within the next t 2 instants 2 and that it lasts for interval time units. Line five uses operator UntilW defined above and verifies whether the yellow indicator is turned on from the next instants where rolldiff is below the critical point until the alarm is switched off. This example is based on a real system, discussed in Sect. 3.1.
This kind of expressions may become complex to write and require methods to simplify and reduce them (Baresi et al. 2009 ). In addition, a "library" of patterns, that is, expressions that represent standard behaviors in given domains (Dwyer et al. 1999 ) might be very useful. Some of these behaviors are embedded in our tool as built-in expressions (Sect. 3).
Specification structure
Our oracle specifications are organized around three layers (Fig. 1) . Requirements define the core of the oracle specification and can refer to one or more Behaviors, which in turn can be reused wherever they are needed. Modularization defines the tree structure around which specifications are organized.
Requirements is the core of the specification structure and comprises the rules that state the requirements behind a system. Rules are grouped into Oracle Information Units (OIUs). An OIU is composed of a main rule and, possibly, two other sets of rules: constraints and safeguards. The Main Rule defines a condition or capability that must be met or offered by the system. Constraints describe additional conditions that must be true when the main rule holds. Safeguards describe what must happen if the main rule or constraints are violated. This organization is intended to alleviate the difficulty of defining complex expressions by providing a built-in organization for rules with trigger-dependent relations.
A (slightly) complex requirement, as the aforementioned Example 2, can be written as a main rule with no constraints and safeguards, or it can be reorganized into smaller rules, if convenient. For example, a main rule can state that a temperature should A safeguard can state that, if the main rule is not respected, the temperature should not be above a critical level for more than a given interval. Another safeguard can state that, if the critical level holds longer than the given interval, a safety protocol must be started within an acceptable delay and lasts for another given interval. A constraint can then state that if the temperate stays below the threshold (no alarm conditions), a green indicator must be on. The organization into smaller rules allows the oracle to report both successes and different types of violations: (i) critical failures, in which the main rule is violated and at least one safeguard is triggered; (ii) constraint failures, in which the main rule holds true, but at least one constraint does not; and (iii) non-critical failures, when the main rule is violated but all safeguards are respected.
Behaviors provide recurring, readily-available, and reusable predicates (defined as macros) for the OIUs. For example, one may be interested in knowing when values are greater than a threshold, ascendant, or if they are functions of other values provided by other signals. These general-purpose rules help the tester factorize common problems and avoid re-stating them several times. They also contribute to maintaining the specifications since a rule used many times only needs to be changed once.
Modularization defines the modules in which OIUs are organized. Given the complexity of Simulink models, we suggest that OIUs be organized hierarchically as a tree structure. The resulting structure is very similar to the organization of a standard file system, where directories can contain other directories and files. Figure 2 shows an example modularization with three levels. The first level Main, which is the root of the tree, contains three OIUs and two modules: Module 1 and Module 2. Module 1 has no OIUs but two modules, each with an OIU; Module 2 contains two OIUs. All modules and OIUs should be properly labeled with unique (meaningful) names.
Apolom
Apolom 3 is the prototype tool we implemented to assess the viability of the proposed solution. It uses Simulink to simulate models and, as already said, a slightly modified version of TRIO as specification language. Apolom collects data during simulation and analyzes them at the end (off-line analysis). Apolom only collects the values of the signals that are referred to (associated with) variables in the oracle specification. Given a Simulink model 4 , Apolom parses it and reproduces all its diagrams and subsystems. The tester can then navigate the model, define the oracle, and decide the correspondences between variables (in the specification) and signals (in the model). Apolom automatically creates a copy of the original model and instruments it to preserve the original from modifications. During instrumentation, dumper blocks are inserted in the model to retrieve and dump the values of mapped signals. Unique identifiers help Apolom establish the link between signals and variables. These blocks inherit their sample times from the source blocks of the signals of interest, that is, from the blocks that define the sample times of the signals.
This solution is quite basic with respect to what proposed by Denil et al. (2015) to instrument Simulink models. In their proposal, developers can use priorities and customize instrumentation: high priority means that a value of a signal must be retrieved after every execution cycle, while low priority signals can be discarded a number of times when performance is an issue. In contrast, our oracles must always check all values of the signals of interest to guarantee that the oracle be fed correctly.
Apolom supports the definition of modules to group the OIUs as proposed in Sect. 2.2. The tool also provides means to describe the trigger-dependent rules through a Wizard or directly in TRIO. The rule-based wizard simplifies the creation of expressions that embed the following elements: variables, behaviors, and shortcuts, along with the logic connective implies between them. Shortcuts are definitions commonly used in the base language (TRIO), for instance, during an interval or with a maximum delay of.
Once the OIUs are defined and the specification is mapped, the tester must use Simulink to execute the instrumented model. Logs are then generated from the instrumentation and the oracle can perform its analyses. To speed up the analysis, Apolom can be configured to limit the analysis by constraining either the maximum number of rule violations it has to detect or the time interval of the analysis, that is, the time instants it should consider.
The analyses are carried out by a special-purpose TRIO analyzer that comprises a main controller, a behavior analyzer and an OIU analyzer. The main controller oversees and coordinates the execution of the different analyses. It extracts all behavior-variable pairs from OIUs and sends them to the behavior analyzer. Then, it sends all the sets of rules to the OIU analyzer. When analyzing a rule, all behaviors are first analyzed. Therefore, if different rules refer to the same behavior-variable pair, there is no need for multiple analyses of the same pair.
Oracle specification
The key characteristics of the tool are exemplified here through a simple, but significant, example: the partial model of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), provided by AGX Technologies 5 under a confidentiality agreement, as part of the Tiriba Project (Branco et al. 2011) . This is a large-scale model (Grand et al. 2010; Shailesh 2016 ) that comprises 6,111 Simulink blocks, but here we only concentrate on a small subset for the sake of simplicity.
To evaluate our approach, we translated 21 system requirements, from the original description of the system, and classified them in three groups: Consistency, Safety, and Waypoints. We also followed the same classification to create three modules. Each OIU was created within its respective module, thus giving the oracle specification a structured organization.
These requirements address a group of subsystems that are critical for the UAV to complete a mission. The oracle was specified to verify the correctness of this functionality according to a set of requirements. Two of them state that:
-R1: "The difference between the autopilot roll command and the actual roll must not be greater than 1 degree. It must be considered critical if it remains greater than 1 degree for more than 5 s or if it is greater than 2 degrees"; -R2: "After passing waypoint 1 (W1), the UAV must pass waypoint 2 (W2) within 50 s". The coordinates of the waypoints (longitude, latitude, and altitude) are: W1: −122.3700, 37.6300 and 100 and W2: −122.3690, 37.6400 and 100, where the first two elements are degrees and the third ones are meters.
As for the translation, R1 refers to signals autopilot roll command and actual roll. There is also a signal in the model, called rolldifference, which gives the difference between the two signals. The first part of R1 does not require any temporal property and it can be evaluated by comparing the difference between the two variables (signals) and a constant. The second part says that if such a condition holds for longer than 5 s, the situation becomes critical, and this requires the definition of temporal properties.
R1 can be seen as a whole, but if any part failed during analysis, the oracle would only report it without being able to identify which part of the rule failed. This requirement however contains an example of trigger-dependency relationship between rules, as discussed in Sect. 2.2. R1 can be partitioned into a main part: "The difference between the autopilot roll command and the actual roll must not be greater than 1 degree" (m), and the two conditions needed to make a violation become "critical": "if it remains greater than 1 degree for longer than 5 s" (s1) and "if it is greater than 2 degrees" (s2). Conditions s1 and s2 can also be seen as specific conditions that must be respected if m fails, and thus they can be described as safeguards of m. If an OIU comprised m as main rule and s1 and 2 as safeguards, the oracle would be able to report different levels of violation: if m fails but not s1 and s2, it reports a failure. Otherwise, if also s1 or s2 fails, then it reports a critical failure.
The formalization of R2 requires a temporal property (within 50 s), but also the definition of a special-purpose behavior:
geocoor d (longitude, latitude, altitude; xcoord, ycoord, zcoord, xerror, yerror, zerror) = Current (longitude) <= xcoord + xerror AND Behavior geocoord takes nine parameters. The first three parameters, on the left of the semicolon (longitude, latitude, altitude) represent variables defined in the model, and their actual values will be retrieved from the log files during analysis. The six parameters on the right (of the semi-column) are part of the behavior and define the target values and acceptable tolerances. Their actual values will be hard-coded in the rules that exploit the aforementioned behavior. The behavior is true when the UAV passes a waypoint (with a reasonable tolerance). It simply compares the measured values of longitude, latitude, altitude against the stated ones plus/minus acceptable errors.
Given this behavior, Apolom can provide a wizard to help the user set the parameters-those after the semi-column-to instantiate the behavior and embed it into an OIU definition. Alternatively, the user can also define a rule by hand. For example, a complete definition of R2 could be as follows: This TRIO-like expression states that when the UAV (represented by its longitude, latitude, and altitude) enters the zone of Waypoint 1 (longitude = −122.37, latitude = 37.63, and altitude = 100 with an acceptable error of 0.0001, 0.0001 and 10, respectively), then there is a time in the future within the next 50 s (2500 instants because each instant represents 0.02 s) where it must enter the zone of Waypoint 2 (longitude = −122.3690, latitude = 37.64 and altitude = 100 with the same acceptable errors).
Apolom helped us identify violations related to R1. The tool can present the type of violation (Sect. 2.1), the violated OIUs, the instants of violation, and the violated rules (main, constraints and/or safeguards). It can also visualize a list of the variables that may produce the violation in the instants before and after the violation itself.
Off-line analysis and caching
Once the specification is defined and organized, it is fundamental to explain how it can be used to evaluate the correctness of the associated model. One can think of both off-line analysis, when data are analyzed after completing the simulation, and on-line analysis, if data are analyzed while the model is simulated.
As for off-line analysis, produced data must be properly stored to feed the analysis. Since rules predicate on temporal properties, which need values for (many) different time instants, required data should be readily available, and then the management of these values can be a critical factor. For example, the simulation may cover thousands of instants, and a value for each instant should be stored for each signal, which means that the oracle must read several thousands of different values.
To speed up and ease the evaluation process, Apolom supports the parallel analysis of all rules and provides a caching mechanism. Every variable (series of values of the same signal) has a dedicated space in memory, called main cache to store a preset quantity Q of values of the variable. A secondary cache of size R, which is bound to a behavior-variable pair, can be used as further help when a rule needs values that are beyond or before the Q values in the main cache. There is a secondary cache for every behavior-variable pair for which significant values are not in the main cache. Note that each behavior may refer to values at instants that are before or after the current analysis instant, and thus a single secondary cache, simply associated with the variable, would not be enough. The main cache is filled at the beginning of the analysis (instant 0) and then updated every Q instants. A secondary cache is filled the first time the analysis needs a value that is not in the main cache with the first R values after (or before) those in the main cache, and then updated on demand every time a required value is not available. R may be different from Q.
As example, let us consider the behavior-variable pair A, a , where A (e.g., > k) is a behavior that must be observed on variable a, and a rule like: "if A, a holds at some instant, A, a must hold again at least once in the next 10 instants, starting from the 600 th instant in the future". If A holds true at the current analysis instant t, then A is supposed to hold true again once in the next 10 instants starting from the 600 th instant after t (from t + 600 to t + 609). Let us also consider that Q = 500 and R = 100.
At the beginning of the analysis (t = 0), the first reading for a populates its main cache with the first 500 values from the log files. If A holds true at t = 0, then we need to analyze the time instants from 600 to 609 to understand whether the whole rule is satisfied. Since 600 > 500, the main cache is not enough, the secondary cache is populated with the next 100 values (instants from 500 to 599), but again this is not enough. The secondary cache is then overwritten with 100 new values (instants from 600 to 699), and eventually the rule (behavior) can be evaluated.
In a real simulation, both caches may have larger sizes, 512kB or bigger, and the need for updates is not so frequent. For instance, the example presented in Sect. 3.1 uses 21 requirements, which embed some temporal operators, and the amount of used physical memory was 153,808 KB and the size of the log file was 11.3 MB. These numbers are quite small, but more complex and real examples would have presented significantly bigger values.
Section 4 presents an empirical assessment of the proposed caching solution. Different values of Q and R were used to analyze their influence on the time spent to analyze a rule (Fig. 4b) . The largest value of Q used in the study represents a size that is sufficient to store all the data that are referenced by the rules at a given analysis instant. The study indicates that (i) the performance of a large main cache, which contains all required data, is close to a scenario where 50 % of the same data are stored in a small secondary cache (where the size of the secondary cache is 1.6 % of the main one); and (ii) the use of small main and secondary caches (with capacity up to 3.2 % of the data, each) provides a meaningful performance optimization when compared to no secondary cache. Such results may be used to guide the configuration of Q and R. The sizes can be calculated manually or computed automatically: static analysis is enough to discover all temporal operators used by the rules, identify their ranges in terms of required time instants, and set Q and R, properly.
The parallel analysis of all rules at every instant, instead of evaluating rules sequentially on all time instants, allows for a better use of memory since values are cached once and used as many times as needed. There is no need for the analyzer to access the log several times for the same values.
For the sake of simplicity, the current version of Apolom only supports the off-line analysis of collected data. All data are collected, stored, and then analyzed, thus given the temporal operators, there cannot be cases in which future data are not available yet and past data are (already) out of the considered time frame. For on-line analysis, the data can be sent either directly to the oracle or stored and made then available to the oracle on demand. Storing them can avoid memory issues that may arise depending on the amount of rules, variables, and temporal properties to be analyzed, but it may impact the performance of the oracle.
A noticeable advantage of on-line access is that the analysis can be performed on the fly and there is no need to wait for the end of the simulation. However, as said, if a rule contains temporal properties, as in the next X instants in the future, the oracle must wait until the simulation reaches the X instants to have enough data to verify the rule. The oracle may continue to analyze the other rules while waiting for the data for a specific rule and put it in a waiting queue. When the data become available, the rule in the queue is verified. The analyzer should then be able to track the instants at which rules are queued, all the data they need, and when they need them, that is, when a queued rule can be evaluated. All these problems convinced us to base our prof-of-concept implementation on off-line analysis as a good compromise to provide a viable and simple solution.
Empirical evaluation
We conducted four studies to assess the soundness of the proposed solution. Our aim was to analyze (i) whether an oracle generator tool is feasible; (ii) whether the proposed way for specifying oracles is practical; (iii) whether the instrumentation added by the mapping interferes with the actual simulation and delays it, that is, we have the socalled probe-effect (McDowell and Helmbold 1989) ; (iv) whether analysis time and resources are acceptable; and, in conclusion (v) whether our oracles for Simulink models are effective and efficient.
Impact of instrumentation
The first study aimed to evaluate whether the instrumentation affects the simulation time significantly. We used a model of a Lorenz attractor (Lorenz 1963 ) that expresses the difference in temperature between ascending and descending currents in the convection. To evaluate the probe-effect, twenty signals (51.28 % of the total signals) were instrumented. The original and instrumented models were simulated 32 times each and the average times for the two groups were compared. Figure 3 presents a Simulink subsystem of the model that represents one of the equations of the attractor. The equation is given as follows:
And its oracle representation is given by the following behavior:
The first line represents the name of the behavior and the variables it uses, which are mapped onto the respective signals in the model. The remaining lines are a translation of Eq. 1, which represents the system specification. The main difference is the replacement of variable i+1 with N ext (variable) and variable i with Current (variable), where variable represents x, y or z. The OIU comprises one rule that asserts that for each analysis instant the following behavior must hold:
For 180, 000 instants, the average simulation times were, respectively, μ original = 14.53s and μ instrumented = 14.5312s. A two-tail test, with confidence interval of 95 %, showed that there is no statistical difference between the two sample averages. In this test we got σ original = 0.0967, σ instrumented = 0.0638 and ρ-value = 0.9515. These results support the hypothesis that the difference in performance between the original model and the instrumented one (probe-effect) is irrelevant or absent. 
Viability of oracle specifications
The second study aimed to investigate the viability of our oracle specifications. The UAV model introduced in Sect. 3 was used to evaluate the time to translate the system description into the oracle specification. It simulates an autonomous flight based on a preset flight plan of four waypoints. The flight plan is hard-coded in a block that represents the UAV memory. The translation was accomplished by one of the authors, who played the role of expert. The transformation was performed by identifying the oracle variables, and by defining the mapping, its modules, OIUs, and behaviors. The times required for each activity and the total time are presented in Table 2 . The oracle specification elaboration proved to be practical even for large-scale models and real requirements. Although we could not find a reference to compare with, it seems an acceptable effort and supports the hypothesis that the proposed oracle specification is usable and practical.
Performance analysis
The third study aims to evaluate whether the time taken by the analysis and the performance of our caching solution are acceptable. The Lorenz and the UAV models were also used on this evaluation with different configurations of the main (MC) and secondary (SC) caches. For each configuration, we executed 32 simulations and registered the time taken. The Lorenz model requires no complex temporal properties because the rules only refer to the current and next values of a variable at the current analysis instant. Figure 4a shows the average simulation time (μ) for each configuration. When rules without complex temporal properties were evaluated, as for Lorenz equations, the influence of the secondary cache is only visible if no main cache is used: μ = 5347 when no MC and no SC are used, but μ = 619 with no MC and 8192 bytes of SC. When MC is used, SC has limited influence on the simulation time. The larger differences came from different configurations of MC. Different configurations of SC for the same MC had minimal impact on the results, as expected, because in these simulations all the data are close enough and the MC is enough, thus, no SC is really needed.
However, when more complex temporal properties are analyzed and not all the data can be stored in the MC, then the SC strongly influences the results. To demonstrate this, we introduced a new rule with a lasting operator that encompasses an interval of 64, 000 values (512, 000 bytes) in which 32, 000 instants reside in the past and 32, 000 instants are in the future (and one in the present). We used the same sets of inputs as above to re-simulate the model. Figure 4b shows the influence of the SC on the analysis time in three scenarios: (i) when most of the required data do not fit the MC; (ii) when approximately 50 % of the data fit the MC; and (iii) when all the data fit the MC. In (i), when no secondary cache was used, the analysis took approximately 8 min. When a SC was used, the analysis time decreased from 31.82 up to 69.74 times depending on the size of the SC. In (ii), the influence of the SC on the analysis time decreases with respect to (i), as expected. However, the influence is still relevant. When no SC is used, the analysis time is approximately 15 % worse than with the SC, even with small SCs. In (iii), all the data are stored in the MC and there is no relevant difference in the analysis time.
Results with a large MC are similar to results where a small MC is used, along with a small SC. For example, when using 2, 048 bytes for the MC and 8192 bytes for the SC, the results were close to those with 512, 000 bytes for the MC and no SC. The evaluation study then pointed out that our caching solution improved memory management with respect to regular approaches (i.e., the use of a single memory space) when temporal properties must be analyzed. These results indicated that the analysis time is acceptable when caching is used, even for hours of simulation with real requirements, large models, and complex temporal properties.
Soundness of the approach
The fourth study aimed to evaluate whether the approach is effective in detecting failures. We generated mutants for both Lorenz and UAV models. Manual and automated effectiveness were compared by investigating the relationship between the number of manually and automatically detected failures.
The mutations were based on the operators proposed by Araujo et al. (2011) . The operators were selected by means of probabilistic sampling (two-stage sampling) as follows: (i) two of the five classes of operators were selected randomly; (ii) one operator from each selected class was chosen; (iii) eligible blocks in the original model were identified for each selected operator; (iv) ten blocks were sorted for mutation from the eligible group for each selected operator; (v) mutants were generated for each selected block for each operator, with a total of 20 mutants for each model.
The Lorenz model was used as a purposely simple example in which all the requirements can be expressed as oracle information. In this case, it is expected that all the errors can be identified. The manual evaluation of this model is accomplished by identifying if the result looks like a "butterfly", if no golden version is previously provided. We generated a complete, automated oracle, that is, defined rules represent exactly the equations the model was based on. In this case, the oracle had all the data needed to analyze the simulation. Figure 5 shows the simulation results of the original model (a) and of the five mutants. If no previous correct result is given, then only (e) is clearly wrong and (f) may be a suspicious result. All the other results are similar to a "butterfly", thus, visually acceptable as correct results. If the tester had access to the right result ( Fig. 5 (a) ), then all the results may be considered as failures (except (b)) because they are visually discernible. The analysis with Apolom found failures in all the mutants, including (b). It indicates that, for a complete specification, the proposed approach is more effective than manual analysis.
We also used the UAV model to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach with an oracle that addresses an important part of the system. This case expresses a realistic test situation, in which the tester focuses on a critical part of a large-scale model that must be tested. In this case, 21 requirements were translated into the oracle specification. The first set of mutants produced (i) 2 models that could not be simulated, (ii) 4 simulations with visually detectable issues and (iii) 4 simulations with no apparent issues. Apolom detected all the failures in (ii). In group (iii), despite the fact that there were no visually detectable issues, Apolom identified rule violations in several instants. The second set of mutants produced 9 results with no visually detectable issues, from which 7 were equivalent, and 1 result was clearly wrong. Apolom found failures in all the 3 nonequivalent executions. Again, these results highlight that the proposed approach can detect failures that would be impossible or impractical to identify manually.
Threats to validity
An external threat to validity concerns the tester. S/he is expected to have knowledge of the oracle specification language (TRIO), of the structure of OIUs, and of the tool. The results presented above witness the viability of the proposed solution if the tester has already such expertise. A wider and more structured empirical assessment, with subjects from industry, is needed to assess the time to master the basics of the proposed solution, but it is out of the scope of this paper.
Another threat to validity concerns the quality and correctness of provided specifications (oracles). As discussed in Bagge and Haveraaen (2009) , the efficiency of tests depends on the tests themselves and the oracles used to validate then: if an oracle specification is incorrect, it impacts obtained results. Since it is not possible to guarantee that an oracle specification is correct, when an error is detected, the specification must always be analyzed to understand whether the problem is in the model or in the oracle. Furthermore, to avoid propagating defects from the model under test to the oracle specification, used paradigms and involved personnel should be different (Manolache and Kourie 2001) . TRIO and Simulink are based on different paradigms, but also the test team, in charge of specifying the oracles, should be different from the group in charge of designing the system.
The approach presented in this paper aims to soften the oracle problem by providing a way for specifying constraints in an abstract and systematic way.
Related work
The problem of validating Simulink models has been studied over the years. For example, Blackburn and Busser (1996) present a commercial tool, called T-Vec, which focuses mainly on generating test data and on understanding how these tests cover the models. Lee and Friedman (2013) propose the automated generation of requirements-based test vectors. The approach starts from cause-effect graphs to elicit requirements as flowcharts: causes identify test inputs while effects expected outputs. Simulink would then be in charge of executing the tests and making the comparison. Zander-Nowicka et al. (2006) propose a test-oriented extension to Simulink. Added libraries are supposed to ease the execution of tests, but they do not take oracles into account. Moreover, Zander-Nowicka (2008) presents a structured test specification for embedded systems and implements it in Matlab. A test framework, MiLEST, provides validation functions-created with Simulink blocks-as oracles. These functions only implement if-then rules with limited temporal capabilities (i.e., during and after). These approaches, even if in some cases provide "simple" oracles, mainly concentrate on the generation of test cases, while our approach only deals with the oracle problem.
Moving to the approaches that embed oracle capabilities in the Simulink model, we can mention Boden et al. (2005) , who deal with the oracle problem by incorporating assertions into the Simulink model, but they do not consider temporal properties, and thus only provide limited analysis capabilities. Similarly, Simulink Model Verification (SMV) blocks (The MathWorks Inc 2016) help check simple assertions during simulation. If an assertion does not hold, Simulink raises a warning and Matlab shows the instant at which it occurred. For example, Check Discrete Gradient requires that the difference between two consecutive samples of a signal be less than a threshold. These approaches use Simulink blocks to specify the oracle and embed it in the model under test. In contrast, our approach stresses the separation of concerns and, similarly to Andrews and Zhang (2003) , we propose an approach that is independent of language, compiler, and platform (e.g., one may also think of Xcos or Scicos). Our solution fosters the creation of complete test oracles that are independent of Simulink models and that can then be mapped onto the model when it becomes available. Test oracles can be created before or in parallel with the (Simulink) models they are supposed to oversee. Finally, the use of temporal operators allows us to specify more complex conditions and thus analyze more "intriguing" cases.
Besides SMV blocks, Simulink provides the Model Advisor to help configure a model for simulation and check, for example, unconnected lines, disabled or unresolved library links, missing optimizations, and other similar problems. Further analysis capabilities are available through the Verification and Validation (The MathWorks Inc 2016b) (SVV), which helps link requirements to model elements, generated code, and test cases, check compliance against modeling standards, and measure model and code coverage. SVV also offers some requirements-based verification capabilities by means of the Design Verifier (The MathWorks Inc 2016c) (SDV). Functional and safety requirements must be stated using Matlab functions, Simulink blocks, and Stateflow state machines. This means that the properties of interest can also embed some simple temporal operators (e.g., before, after, at, and every). Finally, SDV exploits static analysis capabilities to detect possible overflows, divisions by zero, out-of-bounds array accesses, and other similar problems.
Both tools are complementary to ours. SVV can augment it with model coverage and compliance checking, while SDV would add additional static analysis capabilities. Our solution adds: (a) a structured specification of temporal logic-based requirements, (b) a trigger-dependency mechanism to relate them, and (c) efficient analysis capabilities.
As for independent oracles for Simulink models, Reactis (Reactive Systems Inc 2015) supports debugging (through breakpoints and single-step executions) and coverage tracking. It can also generate test cases from models and check models against user-defined assertions. Such assertions can be stated as either C-like expressions, Stateflow state machines, or ad-hoc Simulink blocks. Reactis does not provide means to structure oracles specifications, like modularization and trigger-dependent rules. In addition, our approach supports temporal operators and more expressive assertions (e.g., we can define the intervals in which conditions should be checked). Schmidt et al. (2015) present a Model Based Testing (MBT) solution for Simulink. An oracle comprises a transducer and an acceptor. The former calculates the expected outcome in the form of performance indices, comparative values, and statistics. The latter corresponds to the oracle itself. The paper only presents some simple rules: for example, obtained values must have a tolerance less than 5 %. The approach is not centered around the oracle generation process and more complex and complete cases are needed.
Broadening the spectrum to different automated oracles, there is a subset of specification languages that can express temporal properties and that are formal enough to support automated verification, like MITL (Wang et al. 2005) , TRIO (Ghezzi et al. 1990) , RTIL (Richardson et al. 1992 ) and others (Nardi and Delamaro 2011) . These works usually focus on demonstrating their expressiveness and do not investigate their use in real-world scenarios with a massive amount of outputs. Moreover, some works have addressed isolated aspects related to oracles, such as the use of abstract data types (Guttag 1977) , pre-and post-conditions (Aichernig 1999) , embedded assertions (Baresi and Young 2001) , wrappers (Edwards 2001) , and log file analysis (Tu et al. 2009 ), but they do not propose any complete solution.
To summarize, a first common limitation is about the expressiveness of existing assertion languages for Simulink models. For instance, the user would have some problems specifying complex requirements like R2 of Sect. 3.1. Another common limitation is that functional specifications usually describe what the system needs to do when valid entries are given or certain conditions are met, but they usually omit a description of what the system should do when an invalid input is given Nadeem and Jaffar-ur Rehman (2005) . Our solution, in contrast, improves the current state of the art with: (i) higher expressiveness to state requirements by means of quantitative and qualitative temporal operators, (ii) trigger-dependency relationships among rules, which allow for the identification of different types of violations (and thus more detailed reports) and for the definition of how a simulation should behave in case some properties are violated, (iii) a modular organization of the oracle specification, and (iv) a paradigm shift: a Simulink subsystem could be conceived to represent requirements, thus, it could work as oracle. However the change of paradigm gives higher confidence that the same error should not be in both the original model and the corresponding oracle (Brown et al. 1992 ).
Conclusions and future work
The development of embedded systems is usually supported by modeling, analysis, and simulation tools. Specifically, simulation allows the developer to define and evaluate the behavior of a system before its implementation and deployment on the target hardware. Simulink is the means with which embedded systems for many different domains are designed and simulated, and thus the importance of produced models is key for the quality of the resulting systems.
While many solutions exist for the identification of suitable test cases for Simulink models, only a few concentrate on the oracle problem, that is on the assessment of the results obtained through simulation. This paper addresses the problem and provides a complete, viable solution for specifying external oracles based on temporal logic. The approach is supported by a prototype verification tool called Apolom. We also conducted four experiments to analyze the approach. Obtained results suggest that the proposed solution can improve the quality assessment of Simulink models with respect to the current state of the practice by increasing the effectiveness of failure detection with a small increment in time and resources.
As future work, we will continue to conduct empirical studies for a better assessment of the proposed solution. The next step is to propose it to an avionics partner for a thorough industry-oriented assessment.
